A year with ISIL

Let's write down Obama's “U.S. couldn't ensure a complete strategy in the fight against ISIL” statement on the anniversary of Mosul's fall.

A year with ISIL

Akif Emre - Istanbul

It's been one year since ISIL invaded Mosul. One year ago, the people, who had difficulty believing the news that ISIL suddenly captured Mosul, had been shocked with the news that after almost 24 hours following their capture of Mosul, ISIL was pounding on the doors of Baghdad.

Everyone was wondering how come the Iraqi army, who had been trained and equipped by the U.S., handed their heavy weapons and armored vehicles to ISIL, and their flamboyant generals reached either Erbil or Baghdad in no time flat.

Within a year, it became evident that the organization, which is formed of gathered militants, was a force that shouldn't be underestimated. The support of the community, who felt suffocated from the Shi'ite administration's fanaticism in Iraq, established their dominance in the Sunni region following the support of the Baasist military officers. On top of that, they've also developed a strategy in Syria, which ideologically came from the same roots, but was directed at eliminating rival antagonists, and declared war against them. Rather than fighting against Assad's forces, they gained supremacy over the field by fighting against the antagonists. At the present point, in the Sunni region between Baghdad's north and Erbil's south, the whole of Eastern Syria and even the area that extended to the south of Damascus, a structure, which worked like a de facto government, had become evident. We should underline the particular fact that their progress was especially directed at capturing the regions with oil and refineries.

By the way, let's write down Obama's “U.S. couldn't ensure a complete strategy in the fight against ISIL” statement on the anniversary of Mosul's fall.

Let us try to make a cross reading over the meaning of ISIL's existence in the region…

ISIL's disruption over the regional balances with their actions and expressions gave birth to more important results than them being a military threat. The Islam image drawn by ISIL and it's political, strategic results had a wider effect than their actions in the region. This is the actual matter that should be talked about on the matter of ISIL and this is not limited to the Middle East.

The destruction caused in the region through their expressions and implementations, more precisely their slaughters, incited a blood-based disintegration, decomposition between the Islam world and Muslims before anything else.

Especially in a sectarian sense, the Shi'ite-Sunni centric hostility accelerated the polarization, including the states in the region.

Their violence, at the level of massacre, towards the non-Muslims, other Muslims, different sects, implementations and understandings had inflicted wounds that are difficult to cure.

The cultural, artistic, aesthetic, law and justice based accumulation of the Islam history had been suddenly sacrificed to the neo-Mongolist puritanism.

The sectarian conflict and ethnic-based decompositions, which are foreign to the region, had been deepened and landed a big blow on the unity of the religious community and especially this community's consciousness. This geography, which performed the unique example of the experience of living with different beliefs and understandings in the history of humanity, started to present a display where the truth is slaughtered in the name of truth.

Their imposition of their puritan religious views on all the Muslims, their strategy to popularize their cold-blooded blood sheds on popular TV channels, had turned into a global propaganda. The addition of a marginal group's implementations in the circulation of the global media networks was enough to be accepted as a role model in the eyes of the overwhelmed, shattered identities and especially minority Muslims.

In the end, the Islamic message, which became evident in the Islam world as Islam's struggle for rights and freedom against tyranny, injustice and despotic regimes, had been terrorized and taken as a hostage.

The chaos and emptiness that was revealed after the Middle East geopolitics were being disintegrated made the future scarier. The civil war in Syria and the complete disunity of Iraq caused a more deepening result.

It turned into a reality, which negated Turkey's desires and approaches directed at the region and took Turkey hostage. The Syria policy, which was already pushed to uncertainty, was almost pushed outside the region due to the provoking strategy of ISIL and the Shi'ite centric marginality in Iraq.

Besides, as a result of the war, they entered against secular Kurdish groups; they indirectly interfered with Turkey's domestic policies, caused the Muslim Kurdish community to be pushed towards secular organizations and caused the nationalism to increase.

Other than the results of the one-year long ISIL expansion in the region, this is a question that should be asked; why were Sunni Arabs, especially in Iraq, obliged to cooperate with ISIL? This cannot be only explained with ISIL's military success and oppression. The balances, which had been disrupted by the U.S. after the invasion, and the central government's Shi'ite policies should be questioned. If the Great Arabic tribes didn't give their support, ISIL's military success wouldn't have been permanent.

Other than all these, putting ISIL's progress by implementing a senior strategy aside, the factors outside the region, which are giving the impression that there is a field being opened intentionally, are as important as the results within the region.

ISIL's activities and the way these are reflected in the media had gained legitimacy to Islamophobic policies and popularized them.

As the Islamophobia in the eyes of the Western communities turned into politics, it became easier for the legal justifications to be created.

Especially on the matters of immigrant policies and limiting the religious freedom, the parliamentarians had an easier time. Also, there were no doubts that this would be continuing while getting tougher.

A fear environment, which will legitimate any kind of military, political and economic oppressions and interventions against the Middle East and Islam world, had become definite after ISIL's implementations and de facto existence.

In this aspect, if there are any senior strategies about ISIL, then it's directed at the result directed at the West's domestic safety understanding and possible interventions in the region, rather than being about the Middle East.

In this sense, it's acting as a film set where ISIL has a part in, and, the scenario and the trailers of this film is mostly directed at the Western audience.

Güncelleme Tarihi: 08 Temmuz 2015, 15:46